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1565 
THE ABANDONED WARDS OF ADMIRALTY: THE 
S PREME CO R S CO RSE CHANGE ON THE 
AVAILABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO SEAMEN 
IN UNSEAWORTHINESS CLAIMS 
Hillary Smith Weise* 
Abstract: This Comment compares Dutra Group v. Batterton and Tabingo v. American 
Triumph LLC, two significant but contradictory admiralty decisions on the availability of 
punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims. It argues that the Washington State Supreme 
Court s decision in Tabingo that punitive damages should be permissible in unseaworthiness 
claims is far better from both policy and doctrinal standpoints. From a doctrinal perspective, 
maritime law has traditionally permitted punitive damages in admiralty cases. Therefore, it 
would have been more appropriate for the Court to adhere to the principle that it is better to 
allow a remedy in admiralty proceedings so long as an inflexible rule does not prohibit it. From 
a policy standpoint, employers do not require the same protections as seamen. 
This Comment also analyzes how the United States Supreme Court in Batterton confirmed 
its unwillingness to use its explicit grant of admiralty jurisdiction by rejecting an admiralty 
remedy because such remedy was not explicitly provided for by Congress. Batterton also 
reflects the Supreme Court s shift from considering seamen the wards of admiralty to stating 
there is no longer any policy need to protect them. The Court abandoned the nearly 200-year-
old determination for a weak policy argument with little explanation. The stark implication 
flowing from this decision is that a cost-benefit analysis for employers now makes it cheaper 
to kill seamen than to make them sick. 
  
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I would like to thank 
Professors Craig Allen and Hugh Spitzer for their valuable guidance throughout the drafting process. 
I would also like to thank the Washington Law Review editorial staff for their insightful edits and 
support. The author is an officer in the U.S. Coast Guard. The views expressed herein are those of the 
author and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the 
U. S. Coast Guard. The External Affairs Manual, COMDTINST M5700.13, Chapter 6. 
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From now on, the occasional employer delinquent in paying 
hospital bills will receive heavy punishment, while the occasional 
shipowner supplying recklessly and outrageously an unsafe ship 
that causes the death of one or more seamen will do so with 
impunity, while laughing all the way to the bank, paying only the 
relatively minor pecuniary damages that could be proven. The old 
joke of the pre-Moragne era maintains its macabre humor. It is 
still cheaper to kill them than to make them sick. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A common adage among sailors is one hand for yourself, one hand for 
the ship. 2 Sailors hear many phrases like this daily a constant reminder 
of the dangers of working at sea. Sailors train relentlessly to minimize 
these dangers and, as the United States Coast Guard Academy motto 
explains, the sea ields to knowledge. 3 Unfortunately, the 
seaworthiness of the vessels that seamen4 work on is not completely 
within their control. Seamen can bring a claim of unseaworthiness if they 
get injured as a result of the vessel. A seaman s unseaworthiness claim 
stems from injuries suffered due to a vessel owner s failure to furnish a 
vessel and appurtenances reasonabl  fit for their intended use. 5 No matter 
how much knowledge sailors gain in seamanship, navigation, and damage 
control, they are still subject to the limitations of the vessels they sail on 
and the crew members they sail with. 
Allan Tabingo was a deckhand trainee aboard a fishing trawler.6 He 
was on his hands and knees sweeping the final fish through a hatch below 
deck when his fellow crew member started to close the hatch.7 Though the 
                                                     
1. Attilio Costabel, Punitive Damages in Unseaworthiness. The Lawmaker Giveth, The Lawmaker 
Taketh, 50 J. MAR. L. & COM. 313, 329 (2019) (emphasis omitted). 
2. TRISTAN JONES, ONE HAND FOR YOURSELF, ONE FOR THE SHIP (1990). 
3. Facilities, COAST GUARD ATHLETIC ACTIVITY FUND, https://uscgasports.com/information/fac 
ilities [https://perma.cc/ATW6-LK2W]. 
4.  The term seaman  is used throughout this Comment instead of a gender-inclusive term like 
seafarer  because seaman status is a term of art in Admiralty Law. Seamen derive special protections 
from establishing that status in accordance with case law and statutes. Seaman status is a nuanced 
area of Admiralty Law that is beyond the scope of this Comment. See Carlos Felipe Llinás Negret, 
Sea Worthy: To Protect Seafarers, Congress and the Federal Courts Have Created a Strong Set of 
Common Law Rights and Privileges, 37 L.A. LAW. 34 (2014). 
5. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960). 
6. [A] large conical net dragged along the sea bottom in gathering fish or other marine life.  
Trawl, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trawling 
[https://perma.cc/3D9R-J794]; Tabingo v. Am. Triumph LLC, 188 Wash. 2d 41, 44, 391 P.3d 434, 
436 (2017). 
7. Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 44, 391 P.3d at 436. 
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crew member realized his mistake and attempted to stop the hatch from 
closing, its control handle was broken.8 The hatch closed on Tabingo s 
hand and he suffered severe injuries, including the amputation of two 
fingers.9 Similarly, Christopher Batterton was a deckhand aboard a 
scow.10 While working in navigable waters, his fellow crew members 
erroneously pumped pressurized air into a compartment.11 This caused the 
hatch12 cover to blow open and crush Batterton s hand between the hatch 
and the bulkhead.13 His hand was permanently disabled from the 
accident.14 Both seamen s injuries were the subject of major admiralt  
suits: Dutra Group v. Batterton,15 a United States Supreme Court case 
decided in June 2019,16 and Tabingo v. American Triumph LLC,17 a 
Washington State Supreme Court case decided in March 2017.18 
Although these cases presented a variety of claims, the highest court in 
each case ultimately only considered the pleas for punitive damages due 
to the unseaworthiness of the vessels.19 The Washington State Supreme 
Court held in Tabingo that a plaintiff may recover punitive damages on a 
claim of unseaworthiness.20 However, that decision was overruled by the 
Supreme Court s holding in Batterton that a plaintiff may not recover 
punitive damages on an unseaworthiness claim.21 Batterton and Tabingo 
arrived at opposite conclusions by relying on different cases Miles v. 
                                                     
8. Id. Allegedly American Seafoods was aware of the broken handle for two years prior to the 
accident. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. [A] large flat-bottomed boat with broad square ends used chiefly for transporting bulk material 
(such as ore, sand, or refuse).  Scow, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/scow [https://perma.cc/J95G-5ULK]. Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 
139 S. Ct. 2275, 2282 (2019). 
11. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2282. 
12. [A]n opening in the deck of a ship.  Hatch, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/hatch [https://perma.cc/8GW4-NSHB]. 
13. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2282. [A]n upright partition separating compartments.  
Bulkhead, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bulkhead 
[https://perma.cc/3AZ7-M6E8]. 
14. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2282. 
15. __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275 (2019). 
16. Id. at 2275. 
17. 188 Wash. 2d 41, 391 P.3d 434 (2017). 
18. Id. 
19. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2282; Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 44, 391 P.3d at 436. 
20. Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 43, 391 P.3d at 436. 
21. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2278. This decision is striking, given that Washington is one of the few 
states that does not regularly award punitive damages. Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 52, 391 P.3d at 440. 
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Apex Marine Corp.22 and Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend,23 
respectively. This Comment explores how Batterton and Tabingo applied 
these precedents to reach differing conclusions. This Comment argues that 
punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims should be allowed, from both 
a doctrinal and policy standpoint. 
This Comment proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides an overview of 
general maritime law. It discusses the sources of general maritime law, 
remedies available to seamen, and the history of seamen as the wards of 
admiralty. Part II compares Batterton and Tabingo. It explores the 
reasoning and conclusions of those cases. Finally, Part III analyzes why 
Tabingo is a stronger case from both a doctrinal and policy standpoint. It 
offers a critique of the Batterton Court s misguided shift in admiralt  
decision making. Batterton illustrates the Supreme Court s unwillingness 
to allow an admiralty remedy that is not expressly authorized by Congress 
despite acting as a common law court sitting in admiralty.24 Batterton also 
reflects the Court s move awa  from its 200-year-old jurisprudence that 
considered seamen the wards of admiralty.25 The Court stated that it no 
longer saw a policy need to protect seamen.26 Ultimately, this Comment 
concludes that the Batterton Court should have adhered to the principle 
that if there is no evidence Congress has sought to restrict a remedy, and 
such remed  does not conflict with Congress s pursuit of uniformit  in 
the exercise of admiralt  jurisdiction,  then such a remedy should 
be permitted.27 
I. OVERVIEW OF GENERAL MARITIME LAW 
The Constitution implicitl  directs federal courts  to preside over 
admiralty cases in the manner of a common law court. 28 If Congress is 
silent on a matter, the federal courts establish the amalgam of traditional 
common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newl  created rules  
                                                     
22. 498 U.S. 19 (1990). 
23. 557 U.S. 404 (2009). 
24. [This Court] cannot sanction a novel remed  here unless it is required to maintain uniformit  
with Congress s clearl  expressed policies,  particularl  those in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 
(Jones Act), which codified the rights of injured mariners  and incorporated the rights provided to 
railwa  workers under the Federal Emplo ers  Liabilit  Act (FELA).  Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2278, 
2281. 
25. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047). 
26. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2287.   
27. Miles, 498 U.S. at 26.  
28. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2278 (quoting Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 489 90 
(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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that forms the general maritime law. 29 However, the courts must respect 
Congress s persistent pursuit of uniformit  in the exercise of admiralt  
jurisdiction. 30 This balancing act has created tension regarding how 
much weight Congress has in the creation of admiralty law versus the 
common law admiralty courts.31 Without congressional guidance, courts 
have struggled to adapt admiralty law to the modern age of seafaring, to 
come to a consensus on how much protection to give seamen, and to 
determine the modern arc of admiralty law. 
A. The Sources of General Maritime Law 
The United States Constitution s Admiralt  Clause states that [t]he 
judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction. 32 The Clause empowers Congress to grant the District 
Courts maritime jurisdiction. 33 Congress exercised this power through the 
enactment of section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.34 Thus, federal courts 
are empowered by the Admiralty Clause to develop the general maritime 
law.35 While federal courts can develop this law, the Admiralty Clause 
also grants Congress the authority to enact statutes setting the limits of 
maritime law, and b  extension, the federal courts  powers in 
admiralty cases.36 
If a statute and the general maritime law conflict in an admiralty case, 
then deference is given to the statute.37 However, there is a rising trend 
                                                     
29. Id. (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 65 (1986)). 
30. Id. (quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401 (1970)). 
31. Id. at 2278 79. 
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
33. Romero v. Int l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360 (1959). 
34. Id. at 361 (1959). Congress gave the District Courts exclusive original cogni ance of all civil 
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . saving-to-suitors, in all cases, the right of a 
common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it . . . .  Judiciary Act of September 
24, 1789, c. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76 77 (amended 1949). This grant of jurisdiction is now codified at 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1333. 
35. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 200 (1996). The general maritime law 
is also referred to as the federal maritime law. Id. 
36. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917). (1) It empowered Congress to confer 
admiralt  and maritime jurisdiction on the Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court  which were 
authorized by Art. I. § 8, cl. 9. (2) It empowered the federal courts in their exercise of the admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction which had been conferred on them, to draw on the substantive law inherent 
in the admiralt  and maritime jurisdiction,  . . . and to continue the development of this law within 
constitutional limits. (3) It empowered Congress to revise and supplement the maritime law within 
the limits of the Constitution.  Romero, 358 U.S. at 360 61. 
37. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990) ( Congress retains superior authority in 
these matters, and an admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the well-considered boundaries 
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among federal courts toward complete deference.38 Complete deference 
in this context means that the court declines to develop the general 
maritime law even if Congress is silent.39 As one scholar noted, [t]he 
general maritime law of the United States a body of general, judge-
made law developed from centuries-old transnational customary legal 
principles appears to be slowl  but steadil  on its wa  out. 40 Many 
admiralty experts have expressed concern about the implications of this 
shift on how admiralty cases will be decided.41  
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp, decided in 1990, is an example of the 
complete deference approach.42 In Miles, the mother of a seaman brought 
a suit against the owners of a vessel after her son was repeatedly stabbed 
and killed by a fellow crew member.43 The United States Supreme Court 
held that she could not recover loss of society damages44 for the wrongful 
                                                     
imposed b  federal legislation. ). 
38. See Michael Sevel, Lost at Sea: The Continuing Decline of the Supreme Court in Admiralty, 71 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 938, 938 (2017) ( For the first 200 ears of its histor , the United States Supreme 
Court served as the primary leader in the development of, and its cases the primary source of, the 
admiralty and maritime law of the United States. That appears to be changing. The Court's admiralty 
cases over the last quarter century indicate that it is slowly giving up its traditional leading role in 
creating and developing rules of admiralty law, and instead deferring to Congress to make those rules, 
a trend that is tantamount to abandoning its Article III constitutional duty to serve as the country's 
onl  national admiralt  court. ). 
39. See John R. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime Law?, 24 J. MAR. L. & 
COM. 249, 284 (1993) ( As Justice Stor  concluded, even a strong implication b  Congress is 
insufficient to deprive admiralty judges of their duty to enunciate the law in conformity with 
governing maritime principles. Only an express prohibition by Congress can serve to deny admiralty 
judges the power to declare admiralt  law which was delegated to them b  the Constitution. ). 
40. Michael Sevel, Lost at Sea: The Continuing Decline of the Supreme Court in Admiralty, 71 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 938, 941 (2017) (emphasis in original). 
41. See, e.g., David W. Robertson, Summertime Sailing and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Need for 
A National Admiralty Court, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 275, 303 04 (1998) (characterizing the current 
state of admiralty litigation as a mess  and arguing a High Court of Admiralt  would better serve 
maritime law consumers in the United States); John R. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea 
of Maritime Law?, 24 J. MAR. L. & COM. 249, 249 (1993) (arguing the Supreme Court justices had 
abandoned their role as admiralty judges and had become followers rather than leaders by refusing to 
enunciate maritime law and always looking to Congress); Lee A. Handford, Do Not Fear to Tread on 
Solid Ground: The Role of the Supreme Court in Furthering Uniformity in Admiralty Law, 10 U.S.F. 
MAR. L.J. 235, 275 (1999) (arguing the Supreme Court should begin its analysis when creating law 
with the assumption that the Supreme Court is the primar  proponent of federal admiralt  law ). 
42. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990). 
43. This case presented a particularly horrendous set of facts in that Ludwick Torregano, a twenty-
four-year-old seaman, was stabbed at least sixty-two times by the chief cook while their ship was 
docked in Vancouver, Washington. See Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 980 (5th Cir. 1989). 
44. In this case, the decedent s mother, in her individual capacit , sought recover  for her son s 
wrongful death, including damages for loss of financial support and services from her son and for 
loss of societ .  . . . The term societ  embraces a broad range of mutual benefits each famil  
member receives from the others  continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention, 
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death of her son due to the unseaworthiness of the ship.45 The Court chose 
to limit the plaintiff s remedies because a claim was also brought for 
negligence under the Jones Act.46 The Court concluded that maritime tort 
law was dominated b  federal statute  and it did not want to exceed the 
Jones Act s limits on recover  in survival actions.47 The uniformity 
principle derived from Miles established that if a statute did not allow 
particular damages then a similar general maritime law claim could not 
allow them.48 Even though Miles did not discuss punitive damages, some 
lower courts have expanded upon this decision to preclude seamen from 
recovering punitive damages in any cause of action.49 
Nearly twenty years later in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, the 
Court did not use the complete deference approach but instead explained 
that Miles s holding was intended to be narrow and fix an issue that had 
developed in the wrongful death line of cases.50 The Jones Act and Death 
on the High Seas Act51 preempted the general maritime rule that denied 
an  recover  for wrongful death  b  creating a remedy for wrongful death 
on the high seas or in territorial waters.52 Miles was intended to create 
uniformity between the statutes and the general maritime law remedies 
                                                     
companionship, comfort, and protection.  Brief for Respondent at 6, Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. 
__, 139 S. Ct. 2282 (2019) (No. 18-266). 
45. Miles, 498 U.S. at 21, 37. 
46. The Jones Act provides a statutory cause of action against the seaman s employer if the seaman 
suffers injuries or dies due to the negligence of their employer, the vessel owner, or crew members. 
See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001). 
47. Miles, 498 U.S. at 36. 
48. See id. at 37; Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2286. 
49. David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law: Miles, Baker, and Townsend, 
70 LA. L. REV. 463, 466 67 (2010). It is worth noting that Professor Robertson represented Batterton 
in Dutra Group. v. Batterton. 
This ultimately resulted in a circuit split on whether punitive damages were available in 
maintenance and cure claims, which was resolved by the Supreme Court in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. 
Townsend. 
The ancient duty of maintenance and cure concerns the vessel owner s obligation to provide food, 
lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship.  Lewis, 531 U.S. at 441. 
See generally Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 28 (1938). Maintenance  includes 
food and lodging at the ship s expense, and cure  refers to medical treatment.  Atl. Sounding Co. v. 
Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 413 (2009). A separate circuit split on whether punitive damages are 
available in unseaworthiness claims was resolved by the Supreme Court in Batterton. Batterton, 139 
S. Ct. at 2275. 
50. Atl. Sounding, 557 U.S. at 419. 
51. Unlike the Jones Act, which only provides a wrongful death cause of action for personal 
representatives of seamen, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) provides a wrongful death cause 
of action for personal representatives of anyone killed on the high seas. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 23 24. 
52. Atl. Sounding, 557 U.S. at 419. 
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available in wrongful death cases.53 Therefore, it made sense in Miles to 
exercise complete deference and look to statutes to determine the 
remedies available under the common-law wrongful-death action. 54 
Miles is an example of complete deference because Congress was silent 
on unseaworthiness claims, although the Court declined to further develop 
the law. 
The Atlantic Sounding Court also firmly declared that damages do not 
have to be narrowed to the lowest common denominator approved by 
Congress  in traditional general maritime law causes of action.55 If 
Congress is silent on a general maritime law cause of action, the Court 
declared it would refuse to attribute words to Congress that it has not 
written. 56 Instead of deferring to a congressional act that was not directly 
on point, the Court chose to declare that punitive damages were 
permissible in the claim at issue.57 
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,58 decided in 2008, Justice Stevens 
highlighted that the primary evidence the Court should consider in 
deciding to permit an admiralty remedy is whether Congress had 
affirmativel  chosen not to restrict the availability of a particular 
remed . 59 He stated that if there was such evidence, the Court should 
exercise judicial restraint in denying a remedy unless some other special 
justification existed.60 Looking to prior precedent, he stressed the Court 
should adhere to the principle that it better becomes the humane and 
liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the 
remedy, when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible 
rules. 61 This principle is consistently expressed throughout admiralty 
                                                     
53. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 26. 
54. Atl. Sounding, 557 U.S. at 420. 
55. Id. at 424. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. For information about the maintenance and cure cause of action, see infra section I.B. 
58. 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
59. Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 522 (first quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970); and 
then quoting The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C. Md. 1865) (No. 12,578)). Justice Harlan, writing 
for the majority in Moragne, supported this principle with abundant case citations to other federal 
maritime cases that had reached the same result using similar reasoning. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 387
88 (first citing The Columbia, 27 F. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1886); then citing The Manhasset, 18 F. 918 (E.D. 
Va. 1884); then citing The E.B. Ward, Jr., 17 F. 456 (C.C.E.D. La. 1883); then citing The Garland, 5 
F. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1881); then citing Holmes v. O. & C.R. Co., 5 F. 75 (D. Or. 1880); then citing 
The Towanda, 24 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1877) (No. 14,109); then citing Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. 
Cas. 894 (D. Me. 1825) (No. 11,234); and then citing Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386 
(D. Md. 1879) (No. 6,625)). 
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opinions. Thus, if there is no evidence that Congress has sought to restrict 
a remedy, and such remed  does not conflict with Congress s pursuit of 
uniformit  in the exercise of admiralt  jurisdiction,  then such a remed  
should be permitted.62 
As shown in the Supreme Court cases described above, there is a wide 
range of views on what the appropriate power delegation should be 
between Congress and the judiciary.63 On one end of the spectrum is 
extreme deference-to-legislature, 64 or complete deference, which 
includes the majority opinion in Miles.65 On the other end of the spectrum 
lies extreme judicial-dominance. 66 Representative of this end is Judge 
John R. Brown s criticism of the Miles Court, which asserts that the Court 
abandoned its Constitutional dut  of enunciating maritime law. 67 Judge 
Brown went on to describe admiralty judges as followers rather 
than leaders.68 
B. Remedies Available to Seamen 
Seamen, due to their exposure to the perils of the sea,  have a trilog  
of heightened legal protections  available to them that can be brought 
simultaneously and provides recovery in the event of injury or illness.69 
The two general maritime law causes of action are maintenance and cure 
and unseaworthiness.70 The statutory cause of action for negligence arises 
under the Jones Act.71 The trilog  of seamen s remedies has been 
universall  recogni ed as . . . growing out of the status of the seaman and 
[their] peculiar relationship to the vessel, and as a feature of the maritime 
law compensating or offsetting the special hazards and disadvantages to 
which the  who go down to sea in ships are subjected. 72 
                                                     
62. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26 (1990). 
63. DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: 




67. Id. at 107. 
68. Id. 
69. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. (first quoting McDermott Int l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 354 (1991); and then quoting 
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)). 
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1. The Ancient Duty of Maintenance and Cure 
The ancient duty73 of maintenance and cure concerns the vessel 
owner s obligation to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a 
seaman injured while serving the ship. 74 Serving the ship has been 
interpreted to include injuries sustained while seamen are departing on 
or returning from shore leave [even] though [they have] at the time no 
dut  to perform for the ship 75 and injuries received during the period of 
relaxation while on shore. 76 Similar to a worker s compensation no-fault 
s stem, this contractual dut  does not rest upon negligence or culpability 
on the part of the owner or master . . . nor is it restricted to those cases 
where the seaman s emplo ment is the cause of the injur  or illness. 77 
This duty extends until the seaman reaches the maximum cure possible.78 
If the employer does not provide the maintenance and cure owed, they are 
liable for any compensatory damages (e.g., enhancement of the injury, 
costs of finding alternative medical care, pain and suffering) proximately 
resulting from the emplo er s failure to pa . 79 Pursuant to the Supreme 
Court s decision in Atlantic Sounding, an employer can also be subject to 
punitive damages if their failure to provide maintenance and cure reaches 
an especially negligent and blameworthy level.80 
2. A Sea a  Re ed  for Injuries Sustained Due to the 
Unseaworthiness of the Vessel 
An unseaworthiness claim stems from a seaman s injuries caused b  a 
vessel owner s failure to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonabl  
                                                     
73. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938). 
74. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001). See generally Calmar S.S. 
Corp., 303 U.S. at 527 28. [M]aintenance  includes food and lodging at the expense of their ship, 
and cure  refers to medical treatment.  Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 413 (2009). 
75. Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 529 (1951) (referencing the Court s interpretation of 
in service of the ship  in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 733 34 (1943)). 
76. Id. at 530. 
77. Calmar S.S. Corp., 303 U.S. at 527 28 (first citing Cortes v. Balt. Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 
371 (1932); then citing The City of Alexandria, 17 F. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); then citing The Mars, 149 
F. 729, 731 (3d Cir. 1907); then citing Sorensen v. Alaska S.S. Co., 243 F. 280 (W.D. Wash. 1917), 
aff d, 247 F. 294 (9th Cir. 1918); then citing Brown v. The Bradish Johnson, 4 F. Cas. 356 (C.C.D. 
La. 1873) (No. 1,992); and then citing The Wensleydale, 41 F. 829, 831 (E.D.N.Y. 1890)). 
78. Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2288 n.2 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(citing 2 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 26:1, ¶ 4 (5th ed. 2003)). 
79. Ethan Kerstein, Navigating Still-Murky Waters: The Search for Punitive Damages in an Injured 
Seaman s Unseaworthiness Action, 97 TEX. L. REV. 673, 679 (2019). 
80. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424 (2009). 
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fit for their intended use. 81 A vessel could be deemed unseaworthy due 
to a number of conditions, such as: defective gear, insufficient crew size 
or training, appurtenances in disrepair, or improper stowage or loading of 
cargo.82 Seaworthiness is an absolute, non-delegable duty owed by the 
vessel s owner to the seaman.83 However, the Supreme Court has 
explained that seaworthiness is not a standard of perfection the ship is 
not expected to be able to weather all storms.84 Rather, it requires the 
vessel [be] reasonabl  suitable for her intended service. 85 The Court has 
consistentl  recogni ed this dut  as completel  independent of [the 
owner s] dut  under the Jones Act to exercise reasonable care. 86 
3. T e J e  Ac  Ca e f Ac  f  Neg ge ce Aga  a Sea a  
Employer 
The Jones Act was enacted by Congress to fill a gap a seaman could 
pursue a cause of action against the vessel owner for injuries caused by 
the vessel s unseaworthiness but could not pursue a cause of action for 
injuries caused by negligent acts of the master or other crew members.87 
The Jones Act provides a statutor  cause of action against the seaman s 
employer if the seaman suffers injuries or dies due to the negligence of 
their employer, the vessel owner, or crew members.88 
Under the Jones Act, seamen, or their personal representatives, may 
bring civil actions against their employers and are given the right to a jury 
trial.89 The scope of a civil action  is defined b  reference to the federal 
laws regulating recover  for personal injur  to, or death of, a railwa  
emplo ee.  Congress thus incorporated the Federal Emplo ers  Liabilit  
                                                     
81. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960). 
82. See Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499 (1971). 
83. See Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 549. 
84. See id. at 550. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 549 (first citing Pope & Talbot, Inc., v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); then citing Alaska 
S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1953); then citing Rogers v. U.S. Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954); 
then citing Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); then citing Crumady v. The J. H. 
Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); and then citing United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass n v. Halecki, 
358 U.S. 613 (1959)). 
87. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 173 (1903). Congress enacted the Jones Act primarily to overrule 
The Osceola, . . . in which this Court prohibited a seaman or his family from recovering for injuries 
or death suffered due to his emplo ers  negligence.  Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 
415 (2009). 
88. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001). 
89. 46 U.S.C. § 30104. 
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Act ( FELA ). 90 Notably, FELA does not limit damages, permitting 
injured railroad workers to recover pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
damages.91 The Court has consistently held that the Jones Act preserves 
seamen s general maritime law causes of action of maintenance and cure 
and unseaworthiness.92 
4. Differences Between Unseaworthiness and Jones Act Claims 
There are important differences between unseaworthiness and Jones 
Act negligence claims, and the Court has painstakingl  and repeatedl  
emphasized the distinction.93 An unseaworthiness claim rests on the 
condition of the vessel it does not matter if an owner was negligent in 
causing that condition: they are still liable for any injuries caused by the 
vessel s unseaworthiness.94 Thus, liabilit  based upon unseaworthiness 
is wholl  distinct from liabilit  based upon negligence. 95 Furthermore, 
unseaworthiness claims require the plaintiff to establish proximate 
causation but Jones Act negligence claims have a lower burden of 
causation.96 However, this is counterbalanced b  the fact that [i]t is 
generally easier to prove a deficiency in the vessel than that the employer 
was negligent. 97 
Another difference lies in the defendant: a proper Jones Act defendant 
is the seaman s emplo er, while an unseaworthiness action defendant is 
the vessel owner or operator.98 Even though the owner and employer may 
be one and the same, that is not always the case.99 Where the owner and 
                                                     
90. Brief for Respondent, supra note 44, at 4 (citation omitted). 
91. Id. 
92. See Atl. Sounding, 557 U.S. at 416. Because the then-accepted remedies for injured seamen 
arose from general maritime law . . . it necessarily follows that Congress was envisioning the 
continued availability of those common-law causes of action.  Id.; see also McAllister v. Magnolia 
Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 222 n.2, 224 (1958). 
93. See Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 500 (1971). A major burden of the 
Court s decisions spelling out the nature and scope of the cause of action for unseaworthiness has 
been insistence upon the point that it is a remedy separate from, independent of, and additional to 




96. Miller v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1463 (6th Cir. 1993). 
97. ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 185 (citing Perkins v. Am. Elec. Power Fuel Supply, 246 
F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a towboat deckhand injured by a defective tool had failed to 
prove Jones Act negligence but was nevertheless entitled to recover for unseaworthiness)). 
98. Mahramas v. Am. Exp. Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 165, 169 (2d Cir. 1973). 
99. See, e.g., id. (concluding an injured seaman was an employee of House of Albert assigned to 
work aboard the S.S. INDEPENDENCE, a vessel owned by American Export Isbandtsen Lines). 
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employer are not the same, a defendant may only bring an 
unseaworthiness claim against the vessel owner and a Jones Act claim 
against the employer. 
C. The History of Seamen as the Wards of Admiralty 
Since the nineteenth century seamen have been considered 
emphaticall  the wards of [] admiralt 100 and alwa s received a special 
solicitude for [their] welfare. 101 Justice Story was the first to coin seamen 
as the wards of admiralty in 1823, stating that the  should be treated in 
the same manner, as courts of equity are accustomed to treat young heirs, 
dealing with their expectancies, [and] wards with their guardians. 102 
The  were afforded these remedies because, [a]t the time, seamen led 
miserable lives. 103 Chief Justice Stone emphasized the notion: 
They are exposed to the perils of the sea and all the risks of 
unseaworthiness, with little opportunity to avoid those dangers or 
to discover and protect themselves from them or to prove who is 
responsible for the unseaworthiness causing the injury. For these 
reasons the seaman has been given a special status in the maritime 
law as the ward of the admiralty, entitled to special protection of 
the law not extended to land employees.104 
Courts often took on this responsibility for seamen, who they felt 
required special protection against the effects of the superior skill and 
                                                     
100. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047). 
101. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990); Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139 
S. Ct. 2275, 2279 (2019). One fascinating case example is: 
The Court s famous ice cream scooper case part of the Court s late 1950s befuddlement is 
illustrative. In Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., a Jones Act case, the controversy 
focused on the sufficiency of an ice cream scooper in the galley of a merchant ship. The plaintiff, 
a baker, was trying to serve ice cream with a standard ice cream scooper. Because the ice cream 
was frozen hard, however, an ice cream chipper tool would have been useful, but it was not 
supplied. Rather than allowing the ice cream to soften, the baker used a butcher knife to chip out 
ice cream and he cut off two of his fingers in the process. The trial court entered judgment for 
the seaman based on a jury verdict. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed, explaining that because [the knife] was never designed for or intended to be used as 
a dagger or ice pick for chipping fro en ice cream,  it was not within the realm of reasonable 
foreseeabilit  that the baker would use the knife to chip ice cream. The Supreme Court reversed 
and directed entry of judgment for the seaman. The Court explained that the scoop with which 
[the baker] had been furnished was totally inadequate to remove ice cream of the consistency of 
that which he had to serve.  The Court explained further that [i]t was not necessar  that [the 
vessel owner] be in a position to foresee the exact chain of circumstances which actually led to 
the accident.  
John E. Holloway, Judicial Activism in Maritime Cases, 43 TUL. MAR. L.J. 21, 41 42 (2018) 
(footnotes omitted). 
102. Harden, 11 F. Cas. at 485. 
103. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2279. 
104. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting). 
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shrewdness of masters and owners of ships. 105 While this special 
solicitude provided seamen with additional protections,106 it also unfairly 
classified them as deficient in that full and intelligent responsibility for 
their acts which is accredited to ordinar  adults. 107 
In 1990, the Supreme Court first expressed reluctance to regard seamen 
as the wards of admiralty in Miles, where the Court denied a seamen s 
mother non-pecuniary damages in a wrongful death case.108 The seaman s 
estate s argument of special solicitude failed, marking a turning point in 
admiralty precedent.109 The Court expressed the belief that their hands 
were tied because they understood maritime tort law to be dominated by 
federal statute and stated, we are not free to expand remedies at will 
simply because it might work to the benefit of seamen and those 
dependent upon them. 110 
While much has changed with regard to the experience of working at 
sea, much has also stayed the same. The ph sical risks created b  natural 
elements 111 are still present.112 Furthermore, the Court s description of 
shipboard life from 1943 still holds true: 
[T]he restrictions which accompany living aboard ship for long 
periods at a time combine with the constant shuttling between 
unfamiliar ports to deprive the seaman of the comforts and 
                                                     
105. Brown v. Lull, 4 F. Cas. 407, 409 (C.C. Mass. 1836) (No. 2,018). 
106. Holloway, supra note 101, at 36 43; id. at 36 (quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 
287 (1897)). 
107. Id. at 36 (quoting Robertson, 165 U.S. at 287). 
108. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1991). 
109. See id. 
110. Id. 
111. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 727 (1943). 
112. See, e.g., Matt Gutman & Matt German, HMS Bounty Survivors: Crew of Ship Sunk During 
Hurricane Sandy Speak of Lost Shipmates, ABC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2012, 4:02 AM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/hms-bounty-survivors-crew-ship-sunk-hurricane-
sandy/story?id=17650072 [https://perma.cc/U7JR-2GYK] (recounting the dramatic sinking of the 
HMS Bounty during Hurricane Sandy in 2012); Travis Fedschun, Hurricane Lorenzo Sinks Tugboat 
Carrying 14 Crew Members; At Least 1 Found Dead at Sea, 3 Rescued, FOX NEWS (Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://www.foxnews.com/world/hurricane-lorenzo-bourbon-rhode-tugboast-sink-rescue-martinique 
[https://perma.cc/92DS-UAM2] (detailing the sinking of a tug during Hurricane Lorenzo); Lightning 
Strike Sinks Ship: 4 Dead, One Missing, STRANGE SOUNDS (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://strangesounds.org/2019/11/lightning-sinks-ship-death-missing-indonesia.html 
[https://perma.cc/U82U-NRFV] (discussing the sinking of a ship after it was struck by lightning 
causing the death of four sailors); Carl Prine & David Larter, Sailor Dies After Ladderwell Accident 
on Board Warship, NAVY TIMES (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-
navy/2020/03/11/sailor-dies-after-ladderwell-accident-on-board-warship/ [https://perma.cc/3AZZ-
UBUM] (describing the death of a Navy sailor after he fell down a ladderwell while underway and 
fractured his skull). 
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opportunities for leisure, essential for living and working, that 
accompan  most land occupations. Furthermore, the seaman s 
unusual subjection to authority adds the weight of what would be 
involuntary servitude for others to these extraordinary hazards 
and limitations of ship life . . . . Unlike men employed in service 
on land, the seaman, when he finishes his da s work, is neither 
relieved of obligations to his employer nor wholly free to dispose 
of his leisure as he sees fit. Of necessity, during the voyage he 
must eat, drink, lodge and divert himself within the confines of 
the ship. In short, during the period of his tenure the vessel is not 
merely his place of employment; it is the framework of his 
existence.113 
The polic  justifications for considering seamen the wards of admiralt  
are still present because of the physical risks seamen are subjected to at 
sea, the heavy weight of authority seamen must tolerate, and the 
restrictions shipboard life imposes on the way seamen live. 
Despite conditions for seamen remaining largely the same, it is unclear 
in toda s courts when seamen are warranted special solicitude.114 Often, 
special solicitude is entirely ignored in cases that a seaman loses; in cases 
where a seaman wins, however, this principle is heavily relied upon.115 
John Holloway, a critic of this unfair application, has called the doctrine 
of special solicitude a tool for result-oriented (i.e., activist) judging. 116 
II. A COMPARISON OF BATTERTON AND TABINGO 
This Part compares the courts  reasoning in Dutra Group v. Batterton 
and Tabingo v. American Triumph LLC, which ultimately led them to 
opposite conclusions about the availability of punitive damages in 
unseaworthiness actions. The two cases relied on different Supreme Court 
precedents and disagreed on whether the policy arguments were centered 
on seamen or their employers. In Tabingo, the Washington State Supreme 
Court cited to Atlantic Sounding to hold that a plaintiff may recover 
punitive damages on an unseaworthiness claim.117 However, this case was 
overruled by Batterton, where the Supreme Court relied on Miles to hold 
that a plaintiff may not recover punitive damages on an unseaworthiness 
                                                     
113. Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 731 32. 
114. See Holloway, supra note 101, at 36 43. 
115. See id. (finding that the Supreme Court had ruled in favor of the maritime worker in twenty-
one of the twenty-three cases in which it had relied upon the doctrine of special solicitude). 
116. Id. at 38. 
117. Tabingo v. Am. Triumph LLC, 188 Wash. 2d 41, 43, 391 P.3d 434, 436 (2017). 
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claim.118 This Part compares the opposing doctrinal and policy reasons 
that led these courts to opposite conclusions on the availability of punitive 
damages in unseaworthiness claims. 
A. Tabingo Majority Permits Punitive Damages in Unseaworthiness 
Actions 
In Tabingo v. American Triumph LLC, Allan Tabingo was a seaman 
who worked on an American Seafoods  fishing trawler.119 His hand was 
injured when a hatch closed on it due to a mechanical malfunction.120 
Tabingo brought an unseaworthiness claim seeking both general and 
punitive damages.121 The issue presented was whether a seaman could 
recover punitive damages in an unseaworthiness claim.122 American 
Seafoods  argued that punitive damages are prohibited under the Jones 
Act s provision for maritime negligence actions, and because the 
unseaworthiness claim was joined with a Jones Act negligence claim, 
punitive damages are barred for the unseaworthiness claim as well. 123 
The Washington State Supreme Court s reasoning in Tabingo was 
simple. Because the United States Supreme Court had allowed punitive 
damages in Atlantic Sounding for a maintenance and cure claim, the 
Tabingo Court determined that it would follow precedent to permit 
punitive damages in an unseaworthiness claim.124 The Court noted that 
not only does the Jones Act evince[] no general hostilit  to recover  
under maritime law,  . . . the act does not disturb seamen s general 
maritime claims for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness  either.125 
The Tabingo Court reasoned that the Jones Act does not explicitly 
preclude punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims because 
                                                     
118. Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2278 (2019). This decision is striking, 
given that Washington is one of the few states that does not regularly award punitive damages. 
Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 52, 391 P.3d at 440. 
119. Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 43, 391 P.3d at 436. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 44 45, 391 P.3d at 436 37. 
123. Id. at 44 45, 391 P.3d at 436. 
124. Id. at 43, 391 P.3d at 436 ( The Court held that because both the claim and the damages were 
historically available at common law and because Congress had shown no intent to limit recovery of 
punitive damages, those damages were available. Here, we follow the United States Supreme Court s 
rationale and find that, like maintenance and cure, punitive damages are available for a general 
maritime unseaworthiness claim. ). It is worth noting that the Washington State Supreme Court used 
Townsend  to refer to Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, whereas the U.S. Supreme Court used 
Atlantic Sounding.  
125. Id. at 50 51, 391 P.3d at 439. 
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unseaworthiness claims predated Jones Act claims.126 The majority then 
determined that Atlantic Sounding was the applicable Supreme Court 
precedent not Miles.127 The Tabingo Court explained Miles was not 
controlling because it should not be read to limit seamen s common law 
claims.128 According to the Court, the claim at issue in Miles was statutory 
in nature, as opposed to the unseaworthiness claim at issue in this case.129 
Furthermore, the Atlantic Sounding Court determined that Miles was of 
limited applicabilit  in the general maritime context. 130 This is because 
Miles did not even address general maritime claims.131 For all of these 
reasons, the Tabingo Court concluded Miles was not on point.132 
The Court next addressed the conundrum of Washington State s 
general disapproval of punitive damages.133 Even though Washington 
does not typically allow punitive damages for egregious conduct,134 
federal maritime law governs admiralty cases brought in state court.135 
Thus, Washington s general disallowance of punitive damages was not 
relevant because the Court was interpreting federal law, not Washington 
State law.136 
Finally, the Court highlighted the policy argument that seamen 
traditionally have been afforded special protection as the wards of 
admiralty.137 The Court reasoned that allowing punitive damages would 
be consistent with protecting seamen because punitive damages are meant 
to punish and deter defendants rather than reward plaintiffs.138 The need 
for special protection was apparent in Tabingo s case because his 
                                                     
126. See id. at 47, 391 P.3d at 438. 
127. Id. at 48 50, 391 P.3d at 438 39. 
128. Id. at 50 51, 391 P.3d at 439. 
129. Id. at 50, 391 P.3d at 439. 
130. Id. at 51, 391 P.3d at 439. 
131. Id.  
132. See id. at 51, 391 P.3d at 439. 
133. Id. at 52, 391 P.3d at 440. Washington is one of only a few states that does not provide 
generall  for punitive damages for particularl  egregious conduct.  McKee v. AT&T Corp., 164 
Wash. 2d 372, 401, 191 P.3d 845, 860 (2008) (citing Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 129 Wash. 2d 
572, 575, 919 P.2d 589, 590 91 (1996)). 
134. Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 52, 391 P.3d at 440 (citing Dailey, 129 Wash. 2d at 575, 919 P.2d 
at 589). 
135. Id. at 52 53, 391 P.3d at 440 (citing Clausen v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 70, 76, 
272 P.3d 827, 831 (2012)). 
136. See id. 
137. See id. at 53, 391 P.3d at 440. 
138. See id. at 53 54, 391 P.3d at 440 41 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492
93 (2008)). 
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employer had allegedly allowed an unseaworthy vessel to sail for two 
years without fixing it.139 Therefore, awarding the employer punitive 
damages would serve as an example for other ship owners. 140 Two years 
later, the United States Supreme Court took up a case incredibly similar 
to Tabingo called Dutra Group v. Batterton.141 
B. Batterton Majority Rejects Punitive Damages in Unseaworthiness 
Actions 
In Dutra Group v. Batterton, Christopher Batterton was a seaman who 
worked as a deckhand on a Dutra Group vessel.142 His hand was injured 
when a hatch blew open due to pressuri ed air inside a ship s 
compartment.143 Batterton brought a claim of unseaworthiness seeking 
both general and punitive damages.144 Dutra Group sought to dismiss 
Batterton s claim for punitive damages because the  interpreted Miles as 
holding that punitive damages are not available for unseaworthiness 
claims.145 The Ninth Circuit held that punitive damages are available for 
unseaworthiness claims, which reaffirmed a Circuit split.146 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.147 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit s decision and held that punitive damages are unavailable in 
unseaworthiness claims.148 
1. The Historical Availability of Punitive Damages in 
Unseaworthiness Claims 
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, focused on a historical approach 
that showed an absence of punitive damage awards in unseaworthiness 
cases.149 He concluded that [t]he lack of punitive damages in traditional 
maritime law [unseaworthiness] cases is practicall  dispositive. 150 The 
majorit  claimed that Batterton failed to present an  decisions from the 
                                                     
139. See id. at 53, 391 P.3d at 441. 
140. Id. at 53 54, 391 P.3d at 441. 
141. Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275 (2019). 
142. Id. at 2282. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. See id. at 2282 85. 
146. Id. at 2282 83. 
147. Id.  
148. Id. at 2287. 
149. See id. at 2284. 
150. Id. 
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formative years of the personal injury unseaworthiness claim in which 
exemplar  damages were awarded. 151 Batterton endeavored to reconcile 
the tension between the precedents set by Miles and Atlantic Sounding by 
concluding that there was a historical record of punitive damage awards 
in the maintenance and cure context, but not in the 
unseaworthiness context.152 
However, this historical record that Justice Alito painted is in debate. 
Professor Costabel, who teaches Admiralty Law at the St. Thomas 
University School of Law, found 133 cases that permitted punitive 
damages in unseaworthiness actions and many more that had dicta 
supporting punitive damages.153 Justice Ginsberg, writing in dissent, also 
pointed to the long history of punitive damages in general maritime law 
at large.154 
The dissent further stressed that even if there is not a strong record of 
punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims, punitive damages are 
normally available in maritime cases.155 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, 
this means that the Court toda  holds that unseaworthiness claims are an 
exception to that general rule. 156 Furthermore, the dissent noted that 
evidence that punitive damages were available was not central to the 
Atlantic Sounding decision; thus, this factor should be similarly assessed 
in Batterton s case.157 The dissent underlined that Atlantic Sounding only 
invoked historical evidence to show that, in the absence of a showing that 
punitive damages were unavailable for a given claim, the common law 
rule should be applied.158 
2. Whether Congress Intended to Limit Remedies in Unseaworthiness 
Actions 
Preference for congressional intervention in maritime law was central 
                                                     
151. Id. 
152. See id. at 2278. 
153. Costabel, supra note 1, at 317. 
154. See Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2289 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
155. Id. at 2288 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008)). 
156. Id. (citing Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990)). 
157. Id. at 2291 ( Contrar  to the Court s assertion, evidence of the availabilit  of punitive 
damages for maintenance and cure was not central to our decision in Atlantic Sounding . . . [A] 
search for cases in which punitive damages were awarded for the willful denial of maintenance and 
cure . . . ields ver  little.  (quoting Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 430 (2009) 
(Alito, J., dissenting))). 
158. See id. at 2278 79, 2284, 2286 (majority opinion). 
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to the majorit s decision in Batterton.159 The Court conceded that the 
Admiralty Clause permits federal courts to proceed as common law 
courts, but ultimatel  concluded that maritime law is no longer solel  the 
province of the Federal Judiciar . Congress and the States have legislated 
extensivel  in these areas. 160 Thus, unlike its decision in Atlantic 
Sounding, the Court deferred to Congress s statutor  scheme as a basis for 
not enunciating principles of general maritime law.161 The dissent 
countered that Atlantic Sounding held that general maritime law remedies 
are not outright confined by the Jones Act or Death on the High Seas Act 
remedies.162 The Jones Act was meant to enlarge the protections of 
seamen, not to narrow them.163 Even Miles, the case the majority relied on 
to reach its holding, stated that the Jones Act, d[id] not disturb seamen s 
general maritime claims for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness. 164 
Congress did not intend to limit historical remedies, such as punitive 
damages, by enacting the Jones Act.165 
The Batterton majority further concluded that seamen should not be 
permitted to recover twice for a single legal wrong committed by their 
employers, since unseaworthiness and Jones Act claims are so similar.166 
The Court described the significant overlap between the two causes of 
action 167 and quoted a treatise that described the two as alternative 
grounds  of recover  for a single cause of action. 168 Therefore, because 
Congress has disallowed punitive damages in Jones Act claims, they must 
have intended to disallow punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims as 
well.169 The dissent articulated the difference between an unseaworthiness 
action and a Jones Act negligence action.170 Furthermore, the dissent 
                                                     
159. See id. at 2290 93 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
160. Id. at 2278 (quoting Miles, 498 U.S. at 27). 
161. See id. at 2286 (majority opinion). 
162. See id. at 2290 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
163. Id. at 2291 (quoting The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123 (1936)). 
164. Id. at 2292 (quoting Miles, 498 U.S. at 29). 
165. Id. at 2290. 
166. Id. at 2282 (majority opinion). 
167. Id. 
168. Id. (quoting 2 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 30:90, ¶ 369 (5th 
ed. 2003)). 
169. See id. at 2282, 2284 86 ( [W]e have more recentl  observed that the Jones Act limits 
recover  to pecuniar  loss.  . . . . Looking to FELA and these decisions, the Federal Courts of Appeals 
have uniformly held that punitive damages are not available under the Jones Act.  (citations omitted)). 
170. Id. at 2290 93 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ( Unseaworthiness related to the structure of the 
ship and the adequac  of [its] equipment and furnishings,  while negligence concerned the direction 
and control of operations aboard ship.  (quoting G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6
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focused on the fact that [t]here is . . . no tension between preventing 
double recovery of compensatory damages and allowing the recovery, 
once, of punitive damages. 171 
3. Policy Grounds for Permitting or Denying Punitive Damages in 
Unseaworthiness Claims 
The majority considered whether policy grounds should compel the 
availability of punitive damages for unseaworthiness claims.172 The Court 
concluded that because non-compensatory damages are not part of the 
civil-code tradition, allowing punitive damages would place American 
shippers at a significant competitive disadvantage and discourage foreign-
owned vessels from hiring American seamen.173 Ultimately, the majority 
stated that [t]his would frustrate another fundamental interest  served b  
federal maritime jurisdiction: the protection of maritime commerce. 174 
This argument seemed meritless to the dissent for two reasons. First, 
punitive damages had been available in maintenance and cure actions for 
a decade and excessive claims have not overwhelmed the courts.175 
Second, punitive damages were available in unseaworthiness cases in 
some circuit courts and again, no influx of cases occurred.176 
The majority then considered from a policy standpoint, whether 
seamen still warrant special solicitude as the wards of admiralty.177 The 
Court found the  did not, calling the doctrine paternalistic  and impl ing 
it was outdated.178 Further, the majorit  stated the doctrine was never a 
commandment. 179 Strikingl , the majorit  asserted that while sailors 
today face hardships not encountered by those who work on land, neither 
                                                     
3, 277 (2d ed. 1975))).  
171. Id. at 2293. 
172. See id. at 2285 87 (majority opinion). 
173. Id. at 2287 (first citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 497 (2008); and then 
citing John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L. 
391, 396 n.24 (2004) (listing civil-law nations that restrict private plaintiffs to compensatory 
damages)). 
174. Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. 
Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 25 (2004)). 
175. Id. at 2293 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citing Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 
(2009)). 
176. Id. (first citing Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540, 1550 (11th Cir. 1987), 
abrogated by Batterton, 139 S. Ct. 2282; and then citing Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir. 
1987), abrogated by Batterton, 139 S. Ct. 2282. 
177. See id. at 2287 (majority opinion). 
178. See id. 
179. Id. 
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are they as isolated nor as dependent on the master as their predecessors 
from the age of sail. 180 Overall, the Court determined that special 
solicitude should only play a small role in contemporary maritime law, 
and therefore, it does not outweigh the aforementioned reasons for 
denying punitive damages in unseaworthiness actions.181 
Conversely, the dissent focused on seamen instead of their 
employers.182 Rather than abandon the long history of considering seamen 
the wards of admiralty, the dissent expressed that giving seamen special 
solicitude is necessary because the unique dangers that seamen face in 
service of the ship are still present.183 Furthermore, punitive damages are 
meant to deter and punish wrongdoers, not to reward plaintiffs.184 Thus, 
the question is not whether seamen deserve special solicitude, but rather 
whether punitive damages are appropriate to deter ship owners from 
wanton and willful misconduct in the maintenance of their vessels. 
Finally, the majority argued that allowing punitive damages in 
unseaworthiness actions would create a bizarre disparity that would 
disrupt Miles s uniformity principle, which established that if a statute did 
not allow particular damages, then a similar general maritime law claim 
could not allow them.185 On the other hand, the dissent concluded that no 
such inconsistency existed in allowing seamen to recover punitive 
damages from a shipowner because [e]xposure to such damages helps to 
deter wrongdoing, particularl  when malfeasance is hard to detect. 186 
Memorabl , the dissent flipped the script on the majorit  b  stating, [i]f 
there is an  bi arre disparit[ ],  it is the one the Court toda  creates: 
Punitive damages are available for willful and wanton breach of the duty 
to provide maintenance and cure, but not for similarly culpable breaches 
of the dut  to provide a seaworth  vessel. 187 
Ultimately, the Batterton majority determined that punitive damages 
should not be available in unseaworthiness actions primarily for three 
reasons. First, there was an historical record of punitive damage awards 
in the maintenance and cure context, but not in the unseaworthiness 
                                                     
180. Id. 
181. See id. 
182. See id. at 2293 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
183. See id. (quoting Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047) (Story, 
J.)). 
184. Id. at 2292 93 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008)). 
185. See id. at 2287 (majority opinion); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26 27, 37 
(1990). 
186. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2293 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Exxon, 554 U.S. at 494). 
187. Id. 
 
Smith (Do Not Delete) 10/4/2020  12:05 PM 
2020] THE ABANDONED WARDS OF ADMIRALTY 1587 
 
context.188 Second, the Court pointed to the fact that Congress had 
extensively legislated in this area, and therefore, it was not appropriate for 
the Court to allow punitive damages.189 And third, the majority believed 
policy reasons weighed in favor of not permitting punitive damages.190 
III. THE TABINGO COURT S CONCLUSION IS STRONGER 
FROM BOTH DOCTRINAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 
Batterton solidified two significant shifts in U.S. Supreme Court 
admiralt  decision making. First, it confirmed the Supreme Court s 
unwillingness to use its explicit grant of admiralty jurisdiction: in this 
case, by not allowing an admiralty remedy because it was not expressly 
provided for by Congress. Second, the Supreme Court shifted from 
previously considering seamen the wards of admiralty to no longer 
affording them this special protection.191 
The Tabingo Court s argument that punitive damages should be 
permissible in unseaworthiness claims is sounder from both policy and 
doctrinal standpoints. From a policy standpoint, it is more congruous with 
the principle of special solicitude for seamen that the Court has recognized 
since 1823. Further, it is preferable doctrinally because maritime law has 
traditionally permitted punitive damages in admiralty cases. Thus, the 
principle the Batterton Court should have adhered to was that if there is 
no evidence Congress has sought to restrict a remedy, and such remedy 
does not conflict with Congress s pursuit of uniformit  in the exercise of 
admiralt  jurisdiction,  then such a remedy should be permitted.192 
                                                     
188. Id. at 2283 (majority opinion). 
189. Id. at 2278. 
190. See id. at 2287. 
191. Scholars have feared these shifts for decades. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 39, at 249 (arguing 
the Supreme Court justices had abandoned their role as admiralty judges and had become followers 
rather than leaders by refusing to enunciate maritime law and always looking to Congress); 
Handford, supra note 41, at 275 (arguing the Supreme Court should begin its analysis when faced 
with an opportunit  to create law with the assumption that the Supreme Court is the primary 
proponent of federal admiralt  law ); Michael A. Orlando & Kyle D. Giacco, Admiralty and Maritime 
Law: The Pitch, Roll, and Yaw of the (U)SS Supreme Court, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 137, 153 (1993) 
(arguing that while the Supreme Court had in some ways made it easier to qualify for seaman status, 
the Court had also made it less desirable to be a seaman ). 
192. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26 (1990). 
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A. The Batterton Dec  S e ed A ca  f Miles Fails to 
Respect the Doctrinal Roots of Distinct Causes of Action and 
Available Remedies 
The Batterton majorit s contention that unseaworthiness should be 
treated differently than maintenance and cure because of a lack of 
historical precedent is unfounded. As previously noted, Professor 
Costabel found 133 cases that permitted punitive damages in 
unseaworthiness actions and many more that had dicta supporting 
punitive damages.193 Furthermore, historical examples of punitive 
damages in maintenance and cure cases were not central to the Court s 
decision in Atlantic Sounding.194 
The Batterton majorit s reliance on Miles skews its analysis entirely. 
The wrongful death action at issue in Miles was not an action under 
general maritime law.195 Miles s holding was intended to be narrow and 
fix an issue that had developed in the wrongful death line of cases.196 
Batterton, on the other hand, is more akin to Atlantic Sounding, where the 
Court decided whether punitive damages were permissible under a 
general maritime law cause of action.197 Therefore, it would have been 
more doctrinally sound for the Court to follow Atlantic Sounding s 
precedent, as the Tabingo Court did. 
The Tabingo Court gave appropriate precedential weight to Atlantic 
Sounding by adhering to its analysis of Miles. While Miles is still good 
law, it has limited applicabilit  in the general maritime context . . . [and] 
is not universall  applicable. 198 As Miles is limited to tort remedies 
grounded in statute[]  and unseaworthiness is not a remedy grounded in 
statute, it follows that punitive damages have not been limited in 
unseaworthiness actions as they were in wrongful death actions.199 
Conflating the Jones Act and unseaworthiness causes of action 
permitted the Batterton majority to argue that there was no difference 
between the two. However, there was no historical precedent for that 
conclusion prior to Batterton. Rather, in prior cases the Court had 
painstakingly tried to differentiate between the two causes of action.200 
                                                     
193. Costabel, supra note 1, at 317. 
194. See Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2291 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
195. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 419 (2009). 
196. See id. 
197. See id. at 422 24. 
198. Tabingo v. Am. Triumph LLC, 188 Wash. 2d 41, 51, 391 P.3d 434, 439 (2017). 
199. Id. at 52, 391 P.3d at 440. 
200. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 500 (1971) ( To hold that this individual 
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The Batterton majority also overemphasized the fact that a plaintiff should 
not recover twice in compensatory damages and overlooked the fact that 
punitive damages were what was at stake.201 However, the dissent pointed 
out that [t]here is thus no tension between preventing double recovery of 
compensatory damages and allowing the recovery, once, of 
punitive damages. 202 
In contrast, the Tabingo Court recognized unseaworthiness and Jones 
Act negligence as separate and distinct claims.203 The Court looked to the 
intent of the Jones Act and appreciated that it was meant to protect 
seamen as wards of admiralty and to expand protections rather than limit 
them. 204 Rather than getting hung up on the absence of historical data, 
the Court concluded positivel  that: (1) punitive damages have long 
been available at common law,  (2) the common-law tradition of punitive 
damages extends to maritime claims,  and (3) there is no evidence that 
claims for maintenance and cure were excluded from this general 
admiralt  rule. 205 These conclusions led the Court to permit punitive 
damages in unseaworthiness claims a decision more aligned with 
previous maritime law precedent and the intent of the Jones Act. 
B. The Supreme Court Has Exhibited Unwillingness to Permit 
Remedies in Admiralty that Congress Has Not Explicitly Provided 
The Supreme Court s unwillingness to permit admiralt  remedies for 
claims that Congress has not addressed is misplaced. Unseaworthiness 
actions fall under the general maritime law, which is a body of substantive 
federal common law that the federal courts are authorized to develop.206 
As such, the Supreme Court has the ability to develop laws pertaining to 
unseaworthiness actions, including permitting admiralty remedies. 
However, the Supreme Court has shown an apparent desire to defer this 
power to Congress. Judge John R. Brown, the leading U.S. admiralty jurist 
before his death in 1993, wrote [i]n the past fifteen ears the justices of 
the Supreme Court have abandoned their [constitutional] role 
                                                     
act of negligence rendered the ship unseaworthy would be to subvert the fundamental distinction 
between [u]nseaworthiness and negligence that we have so painstakingly and repeatedly emphasized 
in our decisions. ). 
201. See Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2282 (2019). 
202. Id. at 2293 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
203. See Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 47, 391 P.3d at 438. 
204. Id. at 49, 391 P.3d at 439. 
205. Id. at 48, 391 P.3d at 438 (quoting Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 414 15 
(2009)). 
206. See Kerstein, supra note 79, at 677 78. 
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as admiralty judges. 207 Professor David Robertson, one of the nation s 
leading authorities on admiralty law before his death, expressed fear that 
the modern Court neither understands admiralty nor regards it 
as important. 208 
Admiralty and maritime law are of tremendous importance given 
maritime shipping s enormous impact on the U.S. econom . For example, 
[w]ater transportation contributed $36 billion U.S. dollars and 64 
thousand jobs to the U.S. economy in 2010. 209 Even toda , 90 percent 
of everything still travels as it did almost 500 years ago: b  ship. 210 The 
Supreme Court s unwillingness to provide remedies while acting as a 
common law court sitting in admiralty solidifies a momentous shift in how 
admiralty law is handed down. 
The Batterton Court should have followed the well-established 
admiralty principle that if there is no evidence Congress has sought to 
restrict a remed , and such remed  does not conflict with Congress s 
pursuit of uniformit  in the exercise of admiralt  jurisdiction,  then such 
a remedy should be permitted.211 Rather than creating an anomaly
because punitive damages are now available for breaches of the duty to 
provide maintenance and cure, but not for breaches of the duty to provide 
a seaworthy vessel212 it would have been the more humane approach to 
allow punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims. The Tabingo Court 
adhered to this principle b  declaring that because neither the United 
States Supreme Court nor Congress has indicated that unseaworthiness 
should be excluded from the general admiralt  rule,  punitive damages 
should be allowed, just as they were permitted by the Atlantic Sounding 
                                                     
207. David W. Robertson, Our High Court of Admiralty and Its Sometimes Peculiar Relationship 
with Congress, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 491, 492 (2011) (quoting Brown, supra note 41, at 283). 
208. Id. 
209. Matthew Chambers & Mindy Liu, Maritime Trade and Transportation by the Numbers, 
BUREAU OF TRANSP. STAT., https://www.bts.gov/archive/publications/by_the_numbers/maritime_ 
trade_and_transportation/index [https://perma.cc/PSQ8-Z282] (determining that water 
transportation contributed $36 billion U.S. dollars and 64 thousand jobs to the U.S. ). 
210. Natasha Geiling, How the Shipping Industry is the Secret Force Driving the World Economy, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG., https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/how-the-shipping-industry-is-
the-secret-force-driving-the-world-economy-1950979/ [https://perma.cc/KKE9-8JR5]. In 2011, the 
360 commercial ports of the United States took in international goods worth $1.73 trillion, or eighty 
times the value of all U.S. trade in 1960.  ROSE GEORGE, NINETY PERCENT OF EVERYTHING: INSIDE 
SHIPPING, THE INVISIBLE INDUSTRY THAT PUTS CLOTHES ON YOUR BACK, GAS IN YOUR CAR, AND 
FOOD ON YOUR PLATE 3 (2013). 
211. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26 (1990). 
212. See Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (2019) (Ginsberg, J., 
dissenting). 
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Court in the maintenance and cure context.213 
C. T e C  Aba d e  f Sea en as the Wards of Admiralty 
Batterton also solidified the Supreme Court s shift from previousl  
considering seamen the wards of admiralty to no longer seeing a policy 
reason to protect seamen. Instead of focusing on the seamen, the Court 
emphasized the burden punitive damages would put on their employers.214 
However, seamen require protection as much today as they did in the 
nineteenth century because the risk of exploitation and abuse, 
nonpayment of wages, noncompliance with contracts, exposure to poor 
diet and living conditions, and even abandonment at foreign ports 215 
still exists. 
Seamen work irregular hours during the day and often exceed sixty 
hours per week.216 The separation from family during long voyages and 
inability to escape work while at sea contributed to the finding in a recent 
stud  that 25% of seamen who participated in the stud  suffer[ed] with 
depression, anxiet  and suicidal ideation. 217 Furthermore, commercial 
fishing is widel  regarded as one of the most dangerous jobs in the 
U.S. 218 with seamen facing higher risk of fatalit , injur , and illness 
than other American workers. 219 A glaring statistic is that the fatality rate 
for water transportation workers is 4.7 times higher than the average rate 
for other U.S. workers.220 
It is ironic that the Court was unwilling to exercise its constitutional 
role when it came to granting punitive damages in unseaworthiness 
actions, yet it was willing to deny seamen a special protective status that 
has been afforded to them by admiralty law since its inception. This irony 
is compounded when considering that the Court is uncomfortable 
exercising its admiralty jurisdiction but is comfortable making broad 
claims about life at sea without providing evidence, such as while sailors 
today face hardships not encountered by those who work on land, neither 
                                                     
213. See Tabingo v. Am. Triumph LLC, 188 Wash. 2d 41, 49 50, 391 P.3d 434, 439 (2017). 
214. See Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2287. 
215. Llinás Negret, supra note 4, at 34. 
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are they as isolated nor as dependent on the master as their predecessors 
from the age of sail. 221 
Both the Batterton dissent and the Tabingo Court also point out that 
whether seamen should be afforded special solicitude is not highly 
relevant to this case, given that punitive damages are meant to deter 
wrongdoing rather than reward the plaintiff.222 Justice Ginsburg s dissent 
noted the bizarre disparity this policy decision created [p]unitive 
damages are available for willful and wanton breach of the duty to provide 
maintenance and cure, but not for similarly culpable breaches of the duty 
to provide a seaworth  vessel. 223 
The Tabingo Court adhered to the general maritime law tradition of 
providing seamen with special protections.224 The Court determined 
allowing punitive damages in this unseaworthiness action might deter 
other ship owners from displa ing reckless or malicious  disregard for 
their duty to operate seaworthy vessels.225 This deterrence, in turn, 
benefits the seamen who work on those vessels. In contrast, the stark 
implication of Batterton is that seamen will suffer from the cost benefit 
analysis this creates for shipowners: 
From now on, the occasional employer delinquent in paying 
hospital bills will receive heavy punishment, while the occasional 
shipowner supplying recklessly and outrageously an unsafe ship 
that causes the death of one or more seamen will do so with 
impunity, while laughing all the way to the bank, paying only the 
relatively minor pecuniary damages that could be proven. The old 
joke of the pre-Moragne era maintains its macabre humor. It is 
still cheaper to kill them than to make them sick.226 
CONCLUSION 
Batterton solidified a significant shift in Supreme Court admiralty 
decision making in two respects. First, it illustrated a recent unwillingness 
by the Supreme Court to allow an admiralty remedy that is not explicitly 
provided by Congress. Given the Constitutional authorization, the 
Supreme Court is able to develop the body of law, including provision of 
remedies, in regard to unseaworthiness. Therefore, the unwillingness to 
                                                     
221. Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2287 (2019). 
222. See id. at 2292 93 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 
471, 492 (2008)); Tabingo v. Am. Triumph LLC, 188 Wash. 2d 41, 53, 391 P.3d 434, 440 41 (2017). 
223. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. at 2293 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
224. See Tabingo, 188 Wash. 2d at 53 54, 391 P.3d at 440 41. 
225. See id. at 53 54, 391 P.3d at 441. 
226. Costabel, supra note 1, at 329 (emphasis in original). 
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provide remedies while acting as a common law court sitting in admiralty 
is unwarranted. Second, the Supreme Court solidified its shift in Batterton 
from previously considering seamen the wards of admiralty to no longer 
seeing a policy need to protect them. The Court abandoned the nearly 200-
year-old determination for a weak policy argument with no supporting 
evidence. 
The Washington State Supreme Court s decision in Tabingo that 
punitive damages should be permissible in unseaworthiness claims is 
far better from both policy and doctrinal standpoints. From a doctrinal 
perspective, maritime law has traditionally permitted punitive damages in 
admiralty cases. Therefore, it was appropriate for the Court to adhere to 
the principle that it is better to allow a remedy in admiralty proceedings 
so long as an inflexible rule does not prohibit it.227 From a policy 
standpoint, employers do not require the same protections as seamen. Not 
permitting punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims makes the cost-
benefit analysis simple for employers  it is . . . cheaper to kill [seamen] 
than to make them sick. 228 The Supreme Court should reassess its 
responsibility to develop the general maritime law and its responsibility 
to seamen by permitting punitive damages in unseaworthiness claims. 
 
  
                                                     
227. See Exxon, 554 U.S. at 522 (first citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 
387 (1970); and then citing The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C. Md. 1865) (No. 12,578)). 
228. Costabel, supra note 1, at 329 (emphasis omitted). 
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